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ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH YOUR REPRESENTATION?—
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
People v. Noriega
1
 
(Decided March 19, 2012) 
 
A criminal defendant’s right to counsel has been embedded in 
our nation’s history for centuries.  The right is codified in the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution and exists as the bedrock of our 
criminal justice system.
2
  Like many other transactions in our society, 
the assistance of counsel is a service that is provided by one individu-
al to another.  This service is essential due to the gravity of the penal-
ties that a criminal defendant may face when accused of a crime.  
Outside the legal sphere, it is somewhat simple for a consumer to fix 
a problem they have with a particular good or service.  If a product or 
service does not meet the standards that a consumer expects, they can 
simply return the good or cancel their request for the service alto-
gether.  This is not the case in the criminal justice system.  Although 
a competent lawyer often performs the assistance of counsel, it is not 
always effective in protecting all of the criminal defendant’s rights.  
Rectifying a claim of ineffective assistance is much more difficult 
then standing in line at the return counter waiting for your money 
back. 
In the recent case of People v. Noriega, the Supreme Court of 
New York County, New York, in a slip opinion, decided a matter on 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
3
  The Court used the 
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington
4
 to dismiss the de-
fendant’s claim.  At the outset, this decision appears to be a rather cut 
 
1 No. 1776/92, 2012 WL 954270, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 2012). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Id. 
4 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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and dry case where the claimant did not meet his burden of proof, and 
therefore, could not succeed in his request for relief.  The peculiar 
and almost astonishing part about this Court’s decision comes from 
outside the four corners of its opinion.  Noriega was decided on 
March 19, 2012, a mere two days prior to two United States Supreme 
Court cases, Missouri v. Frye
5
 and Lafler v. Cooper,
6
 which are deci-
sions that some speculate will have major ramifications on claims for 
ineffective assistance and the future practice of criminal law.
7
  It is 
surprising that a state court would make a decision on a particular is-
sue days before it knew that the United States Supreme Court would 
decide on that same issue. 
This article will explore the decision in Noriega, the history 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim through Strickland and 
its successors, the ramifications of Lafler and Frye on the criminal 
law practice and what effect they might have had on the decision in 
Noriega. 
I. NORIEGA AND THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
FROM A NEW YORK PERSPECTIVE 
Just like many enumerated constitutional rights, the right to 
counsel is also given to the residents of the State of New York 
through its own constitution.  In Article I section 6 of the New York 
State Constitution, a criminal defendant “[i]n any trial in any court 
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in 
person and with counsel.”8  The existence of this right is not what is 
disputed; it is the extent and quality of the performance and at what 
stages it must be provided. 
A. People v. Noriega 
The defendant, Noriega, was charged with selling a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance, both of which 
were class B felonies.
9
  Noriega was arrested after he had sold two 
containers of cocaine to an undercover officer and was found to have 
 
5 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
6 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
7 Daniel W. Russo, Criminal Law Focus, Criminal Defense Attorneys and Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, Nassau Lawyer, June 2012, at 17. 
8 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
9 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *1. 
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a third container in his possession on February 28, 1992.
10
  The de-
fendant eventually pled guilty to a class C felony and received a five-
year sentence of probation.
11
  After failing to make his scheduled vis-
its to the Department of Probation and to court, a warrant for his ar-
rest was issued on May 21, 1992.
12
  He evaded police for nine years 
before being arrested on that warrant on May 31, 2011.
13
  Before sen-
tencing, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
agency “apparently lodged a detainer against the defendant.”14  Nor-
iega was sentenced to five years of probation and was then released 
into ICE custody.
15
 
The defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to 
Criminal Procedure Law, section 440.10,
16
 claiming that he “received 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards articulated in 
Padilla v. Kentucky.”17  Noriega further alleged that his attorney’s 
failure to tell him that he would face deportation as a result of his 
plea was ineffective assistance of counsel.
18
  The defendant claimed 
he would have never taken the plea if his attorney made him aware of 
the consequences.
19
 
The Court explained that “to prevail on an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, defendant must show that counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient.”20  Counsel’s assistance must have been “un-
reasonable under the prevailing professional norms at the time of the 
representation.”21  The Court also stated that under the standards of 
Strickland, the defendant must show that the “deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant.”22  “In order to establish prejudice under 
Strickland, defendant ‘must convince the court that a decision to re-
 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *1. 
15 Id. 
16 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 410.10 (McKinney 2012). 
17 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *1; 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (holding that counsel 
was ineffective because he failed to advise the defendant that his plea would result in an 
automatic deportation.)  The Court in Padilla also held that defendant’s claim was subject to 
the standards set forth in Strickland not only because counsel had made explicit 
misrepresentations but also because of counsel’s omission.  Id. at 1484. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *1. 
22 Id. 
3
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ject the plea bargain and proceed to trial would have been rational 
under the circumstances.’ ”23 
Noriega was arrested and charged with a B felony, a very se-
rious crime.
24
  The Court explained that the defendant faced up to 
twenty-five years of incarceration if convicted at trial and accepted a 
very favorable plea.
25
  The defendant was apprehended immediately 
after he was seen selling illegal drugs to an undercover officer and 
“also had additional drugs in his possession.”26  The case against 
Noriega was very strong and the likelihood of being convicted at trial 
was almost certain.
27
  The Court concluded that the “[d]efendant’s 
assertion that he would have gone to trial and risked substantial jail 
time strains credulity.”28  In other words, the Court did not believe 
that Noriega’s choice to forgo the plea and proceed to trial would be 
rational under the circumstances.  Even if he had known that he 
would face deportation his sentence of five years of probation plus 
deportation was better then even the minimum of eight years in pris-
on he would have faced if convicted at trial. 
The Court continued to explain that the defendant’s claim had 
little to no merit.
29
  The defendant sparked the attention of the ICE 
while he was incarcerated for failing to hold up his part of the 1992 
plea agreement.
30
  “Rather than being prejudiced by his non-jail dis-
position in 1992, defendant, himself, actually lessened his chances of 
being deported by accepting the plea offer.”31  It was the defendant’s 
unilateral actions, violating the agreed upon plea, that got him incar-
cerated and caused the ICE to get involved.
32
  Noriega therefore 
failed to make a prima facie case for prejudice which precluded the 
Court from having to address his assertion that counsel “failed to 
properly advice him pursuant to Padilla.”33 The defendant’s motion 
pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law, section 440.10, was denied and 
because his claim was based on unsupported facts and conclusions, 
 
23 Id. at *1 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *1. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. 
31 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *2. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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the Court denied “his motion without a hearing.”34 
The Court in Noriega made some valid points.  The fact that 
Noriega now faces deportation could only be attributed to his own 
actions.  He did not hold up his end of the bargain in the 1992 plea, 
and therefore, was incarcerated causing him to come up on the ICE 
radar.  Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion lacked any discussion of 
what Noriega’s attorney actually advise him of.  Did counsel explain 
the plea bargain?  Did he address the consequences of violating the 
plea?  Had Noriega known he would be incarcerated, and therefore 
deported, would he still have violated it?  Would any of this consti-
tute a prejudice and a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel? These are all issues that were not addressed in the Court’s 
opinion, which might have been the result of Noriega not raising 
them in his motion. 
The seminal case in New York State on the issue of whether 
“incorrect advice as to deportation consequences of a plea may con-
stitute ineffective assistance of counsel” is People v. McDonald.35  
The Court in McDonald held counsel’s incorrect advice that his 
guilty plea would not cause him to be deported constituted a defi-
ciency in performance, which satisfied the first prong of the Strick-
land ineffective assistance of counsel test.
36
  However, the defendant 
failed to make a prima facie case showing that counsel’s deficiency 
caused any prejudice, and therefore, his claim for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel failed.
37
 
B. People v. McDonald 
The defendant was a lawfully admitted alien from Jamaica.
38
  
He had lived in the United States for over 20 years, and had three 
children, who were all American citizens; he was also married to an 
American citizen.
39
  In April 1999, the defendant was arrested for 
various offenses including criminal sale and possession of marihuana 
and criminal possession of controlled substances.
40
  After being ad-
vised by his attorney, McDonald took a plea to lesser charges in 
 
34 Id. (citing People v. McDonald, 803 N.E.2d 131, 135 (N.Y. 2003)). 
35 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 132. 
36 Id. at 134-35. 
37 Id. at 135. 
38 Id. at 132. 
39 Id. 
40 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 132. 
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which his sentence would be “concurrent indeterminate prison terms 
of 1 to 3 years.”41  A day after the defendant took the plea, the United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) gave McDon-
ald notice that they would be holding a hearing for his “deportation 
based on his convictions.”42 
The defendant made a motion to “vacate the judgment of con-
viction under CPL § 440.10 (1) (h),
43
 contending that defendant had 
been denied effective assistance of counsel.”44  Defense counsel ad-
mitted to the Court that he incorrectly told his client that his guilty 
plea would not cause him to be deported.
45
  Counsel further alleged 
that during the plea negotiations the District Attorney made the same 
incorrect assertion to the defendant, and therefore, McDonald agreed 
to the plea, relying on counsel’s “affirmative misstatements and legal 
errors.”46  The defendant argued that he depended on these misrepre-
sentations, and therefore, the plea was constitutionally invalid.
47
 
The county court denied the defendant’s motion because he 
failed to make a showing that the “outcome of the trial would have 
been any different had the defendant not plead guilty,” therefore, fail-
ing to show a prejudice occurred due to counsel’s faulty advice.48  
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to 
show that if he rejected the proposed plea the result of the proceeding 
would have changed.
49
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s deci-
sion for similar reasons.
50
  The Court stated, “the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitu-
tion.”51  A defendant who challenges the validity of “their guilty plea 
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel must establish that 
defense counsel’s advice was not within the standards set forth in 
Strickland.”52  The Court conveyed the two-prong test given in 
Strickland: (1) “defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 410.10 (1) (h) (McKinney 2010). 
44 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 132-33. 
45 Id. at 133. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 133. 
50 Id. at 135. 
51 Id. at 133. 
52 Id. at 133-34 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/24
2013]  SATISFIED WITH YOUR REPRESENTATION? 1475 
deficient;” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense.”53  This discussion of the Strickland test is commonplace in 
cases involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
Court’s discussion of the decision in Hill v. Lockard is what distin-
guishes McDonald from the rest of the group.
54
 
The Court in Hill conveyed that there are two types of cases 
involving ineffective assistance challenges in which the court must 
indulge in a prediction analysis: (1) “where the alleged error of coun-
sel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evi-
dence” and (2) “where alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise 
the defendant of potential affirmative defense to the crime.”55  The 
County Court and Appellate Division both relied on the Hill predic-
tion analysis in order to dismiss the defendant’s claim under the prej-
udice prong of the Strickland.
56
  The Court of Appeals disagreed, 
stating that the defendant did not allege either of the two situations 
stated in Hill and in this particular case the “sufficiency of the de-
fendant’s factual allegations as to prejudice should be evaluated with 
reference to the face of the pleadings, the context of the motion and 
the defendant’s access to information.”57  The defendant’s motion 
merely stated that defense counsel misinformed McDonald about the 
consequences of his guilty plea.
58
  The Court of Appeals affirmed 
based on the fact that the defendant’s motion made no “allegations 
that, but for counsel’s error, defendant would not have pleaded 
guilty.”59 
The Court in McDonald took the decisions of Strickland and 
Hill in order to come up with a thorough analysis of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  Most ineffective assistance challenges 
hinge on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, but the Court in 
McDonald made it a point to clarify the decision made in Hill.  The 
Court in McDonald explained that not every prejudice analysis re-
quired the court to predict what would have occurred at trial if the de-
fendant did not take the plea.
60
  Instead, the Court in McDonald pin-
 
53 Id. at 134 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
54 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (discussing that in certain circumstances, in order to fulfill the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test there will have to be a prediction of the outcome of a 
trial that never happened). 
55 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 134 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). 
56 Id. at 135. 
57 Id. (citing People v. Menoza, 624 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (N.Y. 1993)). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 135. 
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pointed the prejudice analysis on whether there was a “reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not 
have plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”61 
II. STRICKLAND, PADILLA, AND THE FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE 
Strickland v. Washington is the starting point to all ineffective 
assistance challenges.  The Court in Strickland recognized that “the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to 
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”62  A criminal defendant 
requires the skills and knowledge of counsel in order to guard them 
against the grave consequences that they may face.  But a person who 
just happens to be an attorney, standing next to the defendant is not 
enough to satisfy an individuals Sixth Amendment right.
63
  Counsel 
must play the “role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial sys-
tem to produce  [a] just result[].”64  This, in essence, is why “the right 
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”65 
A. Strickland v. Washington 
The defendant in Strickland was arrested in connection with 
three capital murders that involved a series of burglaries.
66
  At the 
plea hearing, the defendant admitted to the crimes and took responsi-
bility for them, but also conveyed to the judge that he was under ex-
treme stress due to his inability to support his family.
67
  Faced with a 
difficult case and a strong-minded client, defense counsel did not 
seek out any character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation 
of his client.
68
  These omissions by counsel were the result of his 
“sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of the 
respondent’s confession to the gruesome crimes.”69  Counsel based 
his defense at the sentencing hearing on the fact that the defendant 
took responsibility for his crimes and did not have a prior history of 
 
61 Id. (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). 
62 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684. 
63 Id. at 685. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
66 Id. at 671-72. 
67 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. 
68 Id. at 673. 
69 Id. 
8
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criminal activity.
70
 
At sentencing, the trial judge found a multitude of aggravating 
circumstances for all three capital murders and no mitigating circum-
stances.
71
  The judge sentenced Strickland to death and the Florida 
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
72
  On a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in district court, the Southern District of Florida held 
that “although trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to in-
vestigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he did, no 
prejudice to respondent’s sentence resulted from any such error in 
judgment.”73  The Court of Appeals overturned the district court’s 
decision stating that “the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of 
counsel accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel reasonably 
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given 
the totality of the circumstances.”74  The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and established a two-prong test.
75
 
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland delved into 
the importance of the Sixth Amendment right of counsel and to what 
extent the right gives protection to a criminal defendant.
76
  As previ-
ously discussed, in order to successfully assert a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a criminal “defendant must [first] show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient.”77  In order to be deficient, 
counsel’s errors must be “so serious that counsel was not functioning 
as ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”78  
In other words “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”79  These standards were not laid out by 
the Court, but rather left up to the professional standards of the cur-
rent times.
80
 
If the criminal defendant successfully shows that counsel’s 
performance was indeed deficient, he must then prove that this defi-
ciency some how prejudiced his defense.
81
  “An error by counsel, 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 675. 
72 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. 
73 Id. at 678-79. 
74 Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 Id. at 684. 
76 See generally id. 
77 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 688. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 687. 
9
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even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside 
the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on 
the judgment.”82  A criminal defendant’s reliance on counsel’s error 
must have had an adverse effect on his defense.
83
  “The defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”84 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, 
stating that the defendant’s “[f]ailure to make the required showing of 
either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the inef-
fectiveness claim.”85  Defense counsel’s trial strategy “was well with-
in the range of professionally reasonable judgment” and the prejudice 
claim had little to no merit because the “evidence that respondent 
says counsel should have offered . . . would barely have altered the 
sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.”86 
Strickland’s test is still the controlling standard for ineffective 
assistance challenges.  Deficiency and prejudice are what all cases 
have built off of since the decision in Strickland.  Even with the most 
recent Supreme Court cases coming down on the ineffective assis-
tance issue, the Strickland test still survives and the Court’s decision 
can be looked upon as a roadmap to standards and protections pro-
vided by the Sixth Amendment right of counsel. 
B. Padilla v. Kentucky 
Using Strickland as a baseline, new issues have come forward 
in the ineffective assistance of counsel area.  In 2010, Padilla v. Ken-
tucky tackled the issue of guilty pleas and the consequences of depor-
tations.
87
  Padilla was heavily cited in the Noriega decision and is the 
controlling authority on counsel’s responsibility to advise their clients 
about the risks of deportation and what was once known as “collat-
eral consequences.” 
Padilla was an immigrant from Honduras, who was a lawful 
 
82 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 
(1981)). 
83 Id. at 692. 
84 Id. at 694. 
85 Id. at 700. 
86 Id. at 699-70. 
87 See generally Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473. 
10
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resident of the United States and had served in the U.S. Air Force 
during the Vietnam War.
88
  Padilla pled guilty to transporting mari-
huana while he was a truck driver in Kentucky.
89
  Due to his convic-
tion, Padilla would have faced deportation.
90
  Prior to Padilla entering 
a guilty plea, his attorney advised him that he “did no have to worry 
about immigration status since he had been in the country for so 
long.”91  Padilla argued at a post conviction hearing that he relied on 
his attorney’s advice and that this misrepresentation violated his 
Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel.
92
  The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky ruled that the Sixth Amendment “does not 
protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deportation 
because it is merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.”93  
The Kentucky court did not perceive “counsel’s failure to advise peti-
tioner about the possibility of removal, nor counsel’s incorrect ad-
vice” as a legitimate claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.94  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether counsel has the “obligation to advise [a criminal defendant] 
that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his 
[deportation] from this country.”95 
In reversing the Kentucky court’s decision, the United States 
Supreme Court held that defense attorneys have the duty to tell their 
clients about the risk of deportation.
96
  The Court explained three dif-
ferent circumstances in which counsel must advise their clients about 
the risks of removal.
97
  First, when the statute is clear and straight-
forward (as was the case with Padilla), a defense attorney should ad-
vise his client that he would be deported if he pleads guilty to the 
charges.
98
  Second, if the law is uncertain or ambiguous “a criminal 
defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen that pend-
ing criminal charges may carry risk of adverse immigration conse-
quences.”99  And finally, “[w]hen attorneys know that their clients 
 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1478. 
91 Id. 
92 Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1487. 
97 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
11
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face possible exile from this country and seperation from their fami-
lies, they should not be encouraged to say nothing.”100  Counsel’s 
omission is also subject to a Strickland analysis just as his affirmative 
actions would be.
101
 
While recognizing that deportation is a civil penalty, the 
Court also observed that it is so “intimately related to the criminal 
process” that counsel must “inform her noncitizen client that he faces 
a risk of [removal].”102  Although lower courts have identified the 
consequence of deportation as “collateral,” the Supreme Court re-
fused to make such a classification and found that Padilla had “suffi-
ciently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of 
Strickland.”103 
The holdings in Padilla are quite important and have expand-
ed the scope of the duties that a criminal defense attorney owes to his 
or her client.  Although deportation is a considerable penalty, the de-
cision in Padilla could make the practice of criminal law more diffi-
cult.  Having to advise clients about areas of law which one is not ac-
custom to practicing may result in less attorneys who are willing to 
take clients who are aliens.  Padilla may also invite more ineffective 
assistance litigation on other so-called “collateral consequences.”  
Where does the criminal defense attorney’s job end?  Will he be re-
quired to advise his client of all consequences that flow from a con-
viction or guilty plea no matter how significant or minuet?  These are 
some concerns that the legal profession may have in the future. 
III. FRYE, LAFLER, AND THE CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
A. Missouri v. Frye 
Galin Frye was charge with driving with a revoked license 
and because he was convicted of this offense on three prior occa-
sions, he was charged with a class “D” felony.104  The prosecutor sent 
a letter to Frye’s counsel offering two plea bargains of more favora-
 
100 Id. at 1484. 
101 Id. 
102 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481, 1486. 
103 Id. at 1481, 1483. 
104 Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1404. 
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ble consequences than the maximum four years incarceration that a 
class “D” felony carries.105  The letter stated the date that the offers 
would expire.
106
  The Court stated that Frye’s counsel did not inform 
him about the offers and let said expire.
107
  Frye was again arrested 
for driving with a revoked license, waived his right to a hearing and 
plead guilty.
108
  He was sentenced to three years in jail.
109
 
At a post-conviction proceeding, Frye claimed, “counsel’s 
failure to inform him of the prosecution’s plea offer denied him the 
effective assistance of counsel.”110  The state court dismissed the mo-
tion and the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Frye 
satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test.
111
  Frye’s counsel was de-
ficient because he failed to inform his client about either of the plea 
bargains before they expired and the deficiency caused him prejudice 
because Frye ended up pleading guilty to a felony instead of the pro-
posed misdemeanor in the plea bargain.
112
 
The United States Supreme Court began its opinion discuss-
ing the fact that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is guaranteed 
“at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings.”113  Therefore, ef-
fective assistance of counsel also applies to these critical stages.
114
  
The Court recognized that “plea bargains have become so central to 
the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel 
have responsibilities . . . that must be met to render the adequate as-
sistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires . . . at critical 
stages.”115  In this language, the Court conveyed that effective assis-
tance of counsel is required during the plea bargaining process, and 
therefore, comes within the scope of Strickland.
116
 
Under the first prong of the Strickland test, the Court simply 
adopted the Missouri Court of Appeals findings that Frye’s counsel’s 
performance was deficient because he made no meaningful effort to 
inform his client about either of the plea bargains in the letter before 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
110 Id. at 1405. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405. 
115 Id. at 1407. 
116 Id. 
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they expired.
117
  For a defendant in Frye’s position to establish the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, they must show “not only a reasonable 
probability that he would have accepted the lapsed plea but also a 
reasonable probability that the prosecution would have to adhered to 
the agreement and that it would have been accepted by the trial 
court.”118  Here, it was reasonably certain that Frye would have ac-
cepted the original plea offer because he had pled guilty to a greater 
charge.
119
  However, the Court of Appeals failed to require a showing 
that the plea offers would have been adhered to by the prosecution.
120
  
The Court concluded that this matter was best received by the State, 
and remanded the matter for the Missouri Court of Appeals to re-
view.
121
 
The decision in Frye will be a controversial topic in the crim-
inal law field.  This decision has once again broadened the responsi-
bilities of the criminal defense attorney and the ramifications may 
change the future practice of criminal law.  The standard of practice 
in the criminal law field becomes a much higher bar to achieve.  Alt-
hough counsel in Frye should have known to disclose every offer 
made to his client, the expansion of Strickland makes being a crimi-
nal defense attorney much more risky and a prediction of heightened 
litigation and increasing malpractice insurance should not be con-
ceived as radical. 
B. Lafler v. Cooper 
The United States Supreme Court decided Lafler on the same 
day as Frye and the only perceived difference between the cases are 
the facts. The respondent fired a gun towards Kali Mundy and 
missed.
122
  After the first shot, Mundy fled and the respondent fol-
lowed firing again, this time hitting Mundy in the buttock, hip and 
abdomen.
123
  Mundy survived and the respondent was charged “with 
assault with intention to murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, 
[and] possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony.”124  The 
 
117 Id. at 1410. 
118 Id. at 1410-11. 
119 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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prosecutor offered a favorable plea bargain in exchange for a guilty 
plea by Lafler.
125
  The respondent expressed a willingness to accept 
the plea, but after advice from counsel he rejected the plea and pro-
ceeded to trial.
126
  After trial, the respondent was convicted and faced 
anywhere from 185 to 360 months in jail.
127
  Lafler then filed motion 
arguing, “his attorney’s advice to reject the plea constitute[d] ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.”128  Michigan’s highest courts rejected 
Lafler’s claims and the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.
129
 
The glaring difference between Lafler and Frye is that in Frye 
the plea offer was never communicated to the respondent, and after 
the offer had expired, Frye had pled guilty to a less favorable 
crime;
130
 and in Lafler, the defendant was fully aware of the plea and 
was willing to plead guilty to it, but because of his attorney’s advice, 
he rejected the favorable plea and was convicted at trial to a more se-
vere term.
131
  The Court referenced its recent decision in Frye, direct-
ing that a criminal defendant is “entitled to the effective assistance of 
competent counsel” during the plea-bargaining process.132  This trig-
gered the Strickland test in which the first prong was dealt with quite 
swiftly due to the fact that all parties agreed that “performance of the 
respondent’s counsel was deficient when he advised respondent to re-
ject the plea offer on the ground he could not be convicted a trial.”133  
Once again, the main and troubling issue, like most of the ineffective 
counsel cases, hinges on the second prong of the Strickland test; had 
the deficient performance by the respondent’s counsel caused a prej-
udice to the respondent?
134
 
The government’s main argument that no prejudice occurred 
was “[a] fair trail wipes clean any deficient performance by defense 
counsel during plea bargaining.”135  The Court made quick work with 
 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1383-84. 
130 Id. at 1383. 
131 Id. (noting that counsel advised the defendant to forego the plea bargain because he 
believed that the prosecution could not prove he intended to kill Mundy due to the shooting 
being below her waist). 
132 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)); 
see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1386-87. 
133 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1388. 
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this argument, restating the notions previously made in Frye, that the 
existence of the right to effective counsel is guaranteed during plea 
bargains and it is not sufficient to point to the opportunity of a fair 
trial to waive errors made by counsel before a trial even commenc-
es.
136
  The respondent demonstrated that “but for counsel’s deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability he and the trial court 
would have accepted the guilty plea.”137  The Court concluded that 
Lafler successfully satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test.
138
  As 
similarly stated above, the Court’s decision in Lafler continues the 
expansion of the standards conveyed in Strickland.  New issues and 
litigations seem to have endless possibilities in this area.  As the ex-
pansion of Strickland begins to accelerate over time, so do a criminal 
defendant’s constitutionally protected rights and defense counsel’s 
responsibilities. 
IV. ANALYZING NORIEGA AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF RECENT 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
At first thought, it is still somewhat concerning that a state 
court would render a decision knowing that the United States Su-
preme Court was going to decide two cases on the same issue very 
soon after.  Although it comes as a surprise, the two decisions of Frye 
and Lafler do not seem to have any direct impact on the decision 
made in Noriega.  The facts in Noriega did involve a plea bargain, 
which was the main focus of Frye and Lafler, but unlike the two Su-
preme Court cases, there was no true error made by counsel during 
the plea negotiations.  It was Noriega’s own actions, violating his 
probation, which caused him to be incarcerated and therefore face 
deportation. 
A point could certainly be made that the decisions in Padilla, 
Frye, and Lafler, if synchronized, could potentially give Noriega an 
argument that his right to effective assistance of counsel was violat-
ed.  In Padilla, the Court recognized that deportation was such a seri-
ous collateral consequence that counsel had to advise his client about 
its risks.
139
  Additionally, Justice Scalia’s had major concerns in his 
dissenting opinion that “counsel’s duties and obligation to advise 
 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1391. 
138 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391. 
139 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
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conviction’s collateral consequences has no logical stopping-
point.”140  In Noriega, the defendant violated his probation and a war-
rant was issued for his arrest.
141
  This could be viewed, under a 
broadened Padilla holding, to constitute a serious consequence.  Us-
ing the holdings in Frye and Lafler, this consequence should have 
been conveyed to Noriega during the plea-negotiations.  Furthermore, 
because the consequences of a warrant being issued were not ex-
plained to Noriega, this could be viewed as a deficient performance 
by counsel, and therefore, satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test.  
If Noriega could show that but for counsel’s error in not telling him a 
warrant would be issued for his arrest, there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that he would not have violated his probation.  This would seem-
ingly satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and his ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim would have more merit.  Although an 
attenuated argument, the continued expansion of Strickland will in-
vite creative defenses and claims for ineffective assistance.  Howev-
er, it seems that no matter how broad you interpret the holdings of 
Strickland and Padilla, their precedents should not be used to retroac-
tively give criminal defendants, like Noriega, a valid claim. 
Of the aforementioned cases, the greatest impact on the legal 
profession comes from the decisions of Frye and Lafler.  Plea bar-
gains are an important part of the criminal justice system.  The vast 
majority of criminal cases end in a conviction base on plea negotia-
tions.
142
  The decisions in Frye and Lafler “may very well play a se-
rious role in changing the way criminal defense [attorneys] practice 
law and how the criminal justice system logistically administers 
it.”143  In order to avoid a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defense attorney must not only advise his client of each and every of-
fer that is made, but most likely will have to put the offer in a formal 
letter to the client or on the record.
144
  Plea negotiations, just like 
their civil counter parts, settlement negotiations, are often done in a 
back room somewhere in private and very informally.  Because of the 
decision in Frye and Lafler, defense attorneys will want to make a 
formal record in order to avoid any claim against them, which will 
 
140 Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia was concerned that if the Court is 
willing to mandate that counsel advise clients about deportation, what will stop it from 
mandating counsel to advise clients about other serious collateral consequences?  Id. 
141 Noriega, 2012 WL 954270, at *1. 
142 Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1406. 
143 Russo, supra note 7. 
144 Id. 
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cause all sorts of problems.  Litigation will certainly be extended, 
raising the cost of legal fees.  The time wasted in court making a rec-
ord of every plea offered and increasing information that must be 
convey to the criminal defendant will take time away from the courts 
to deal with other matters.  No longer will a criminal defendant be 
able to cop a quick deal in the interrogation room.  The wheeling and 
dealing between defense attorneys and assistant district attorneys will 
drastically decrease and a system that has a reputation of a slow pace 
may soon come to a screeching halt. 
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